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Summary 
 
Population ageing in Europe is likely to lead to changes in the 
provision of pensions and health services.  Retirement ages, work 
practices and housing needs will be affected but changes are 
likely to be mediated via new technology and hence cannot be 
exactly predicted. While the ageing population is usually 
projected in terms of dependency or support ratios, in this paper 
projections are for older people as a proportion of eligible 
voters. American experience of the growing power of the elder's 
lobby is related to the European context, with emphasis on the 
growth of a framework for lobbying activity in a European context. 
While a mass movement of older people is even less likely in 
Europe than in the USA, public choice theory would suggest that as 
the numbers of older people rises towards 50% of eligible voters, 
politicians and policy makers will change their policies even 
without a united elderly bloc vote. There is also empirical 
evidence to suggest that policy makers perceive elderly people as 
a homogeneous, and hence a more powerful, bloc than their real 
divisions in terms of age, class, ethnicity and gender might 
indicate.  
 
The European situation differs from the American in that the 
proportion of older voters is very much higher over all and will 
be even higher in retirement areas and in areas of out migration. 
The development of a Europe of the regions may allow older 
peoples' pressure groups to have greater influence in Brussels, 
by-passing their national governments. They may therefore be more 
effective than at present appears likely when the situation is 
looked at from a national perspective.  Older women who, in some 
countries will make up 30% of the potential electorate, may come 
to have a growing influence on social policy as they unite with 
younger women to improve access to equal European citizenship for 
caregivers and those who receive care. 
 
 
 
The challenge of an ageing electorate: changes in the formation of 
social policy in Europe? 
 
 
The ageing of European populations is now a widely understood 
phenomenon. There are minor variations in the rate of ageing and 
the composition of the aged population across Europe, but the 
trend is common to all countries. The implications of the change 
have attracted little positive comment. However, 1993 is the 
European Year of the Elderly and the time is ripe for a 
reconsideration of the place of elders in public policy formation. 
This article is intended to provoke discussion on different 
aspects of policy in ageing societies. The content is necessarily 
speculative. Not only is the future unknown but necessary 
information is often lacking (for example from longitudinal 
studies of ageing) because the elderly have not been a major 
concern of governments or social scientists.  
 
Discussion of the social policy of ageing tends to be either 
negative or patronising - sometimes both. The structured 
dependency theorists (Estes, 1979; Townsend, 1981; 1986; 
Phillipson, 1982; Walker, 1980; 1983), have, often with the best 
intentions, seen old age as a time of marginalisation, of 
uselessness to a capitalist economy and as worse than useless - a 
burden. Old people are described as being forced out of the labour 
force into dependency, first on pensions and then on social and 
residential care. This structured dependency model has been 
challenged (Dant,1988; Johnson, 1988) by evidence that many, if 
not most, old people retire willingly and the great majority lead 
independent lives for many years afterwards. However, the poverty 
of older people, particularly the oldest old and women, lends 
support to some aspects of structured dependency theory. 
 
In discussions of present policy, social security and health have 
attracted the most attention. Social security policies in response 
to an ageing population are well set out in ILO (1987). The 
message in this publication is determinedly up beat but the facts, 
as presented, belie the message: a smaller working population 
could find it increasingly hard to finance pensions for the 
growing number of retired elders. 
 
In health care the well documented fact that older people are 
heavy users of health services is used to justify another doom and 
gloom scenario (see for example Haut Conseil de la population et 
la famille, 1992). In UK at present a person over 75 is four times 
more likely to be hospitalised in any one year than an adult aged 
less than 44. Costs are high. In health and social security the 
old are often seen as a burden which is about to become 
intolerable.  
 
Policy Formation 
 
The process of policy formation involves groups of younger adults 
acting on behalf of old people, rather than old people themselves. 
These groups are part of what Estes (1979) has called the 'aging 
enterprise'. They help to keep alive the idea of the elderly as a 
special client group in social policy.  Pressure groups, 
gerontologists and service providers attempt to counteract the 
negative image of old people by a variety of campaigns, eg the 
European Year of the Elderly and Intergenerational Solidarity 
(1993). However by maintaining the image of old people as a 
disadvantaged group who are unable to speak for themselves and 
have to rely on powerful, often upper class, campaigners they undo 
much of what they accomplish. 
 
The question posed here is whether European elders will shift from 
being the recipients or objects of social policy to having  a real 
influence on policies which enhance their own interests. The 
following sections consider how far American experience might 
apply to Europe and how far specifically European conditions will 
influence possible outcomes. 
 
Demographic change and its implications 
 
The demographic projections of the numbers of older Europeans (see 
Table 1) are unlikely to be very far wrong. Short of a 
catastrophic decline in life expectancy, the numbers of older 
people are predictable. At present the AIDS epidemic does not 
appear to be sufficiently virulent in Europe to bring about a 
major downturn in survival rates. Changes in the birthrate could, 
and very likely will, occur but they will take time, (upwards of 
18 years), to work their way through to the voting age population.  
 
We are heading for a series of European societies such as have 
never been known on earth before: societies where children, who 
used to be in the majority, will be a relatively small minority, 
and the majority of adults will be over 50. It is agreed that 
these societies will be different, (see for example Gillion, 1991) 
but first, we do not know how they will differ from today and 
second, the prospect of radically different societies is not yet 
part of our everyday thinking. 
 
Cohort effects 
 
The effect of life experiences on different generations of elders 
cannot be predicted, (see below on voting behaviour). However it 
is widely believed that elders of the future will be less passive, 
have higher expectations and be more demanding than current 
pensioners. Cohort studies identify differences across age groups 
(see for example DaneAge (1990) which found cohort differences in 
a wide range of areas from a propensity to take exercise to 
political participation). It is certain that the elders of the 
future will be on average more educated and more healthy. They 
will most probably be better housed and in most countries will be 
better off financially. The social support they can call on from 
their families is likely to change as more women remain in paid 
work but this does not mean that older people will feel neglected. 
 
Health 
 
It is not clear whether life expectancy will go on increasing as 
it has in past years in  most countries (Eastern Europe excepted), 
but better health (see for example Henning, (1992) on the improved 
health of elders in Denmark) will enable older people to take an 
active part in their communities for longer and hence to hold more 
power and be more active as voters.  
  .  
While increases in the numbers and proportions of the very old 
(over 85) will almost certainly mean an increase in expenditure on 
social and medical care, we cannot assume that the increase will 
be pro rata. All European countries except Greece are at present 
trying to contain health care costs (Abel-Smith, 1992). 
Technological changes are in sight which will allow a great many 
more procedures to be done on an outpatient basis or in local 
health centres or clinics. Costs will fall. These trends combined 
with the 'living will' movement (which allows a person to specify 
that they will not be subjected to needless medical procedures 
when they are dying), and cost cutting attempts to end heroic 
surgery on terminally ill patients, may greatly reduce the cost of 
elder treatment. Such developments would cut the costs of health 
care for the elderly relative to the costs for other age groups. 
The demand for elderly health care would thus be seen as less 
excessive and so have greater legitimacy. It can be argued that 
'minimalist medicine' for older people will be both cost effective 
and better for patients (James Malone Lee, personal 
communication). 
 
Work 
 
The future of older workers is problematic. The relation between 
pension levels, capital accumulation and expectations will 
interact with opportunities for employment. Much will depend on 
national and local economic development. In areas where work is 
available, or if existing work is shared differently across age 
groups and sexes, it is very likely that older people will 
continue in paid work for longer than they do today, even in 
countries such as Greece where activity rates are still high. In 
depressed areas paid working life may get still shorter. Women are 
likely to show different participation patterns from men. For 
example older women's participation rates have risen in UK and 
Sweden in the last few years (Esping-Anderson and Sonnberger, 
1989). It is possible that retirement ages will be raised but such 
a change will need to be accompanied by European directives 
against age discrimination in employment if it is to be of much 
assistance to older workers (see EurolinkAge, 1991 for information 
on campaigns against age discrimination). Where labour force 
participation is maintained, incomes and participation in 
community and political life (including trade unions) are likely 
to be higher than at present. 
 
Housing 
 
In much of Europe, particularly the Mediterranean states, housing 
for older people still involves a degree of co-residence with 
other age groups. There is no reason to think that this will 
persist, given the preference of older people for 'intimacy at a 
distance'- living near, but not with, their kin, which has 
developed in most norther European countries.  
 
So far the concept of housing for the life course, or 'mobility' 
housing which incorporates facilities for disabled people into 
basic housing specifications, has made only a limited impact 
outside Scandinavia. As, or if, the policy is accepted and 
mobility standards are incorporated into building regulations, 
much disability in older people which now demands 
institutionalisation or some form of community care may become a 
matter of self care. Once again autonomy and the potential for 
political participation may increase. 
 
Mobility and technological advance 
 
It is not possible to predict how long it will take for computer 
and other technologies to revolutionise the use of transport (in 
terms of shopping needs), of work (in terms of dispersion of 
workplaces to the home, and of communications (in terms of 
monitoring frail elders and getting assistance to them as needed), 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1984). Certainly the 
success of Minitel in France suggests that much could be achieved 
in ten years and that a revolution may be possible in 20. 
 
Many current disabilities of frail elders could be reduced by 
simple changes such as buses with tail end lifts, already used in 
some districts in Sweden. The development of cheap, safe, effort 
free personal transport would revolutionise mobility for many in 
later life. Computerised shopping and bill payment will be another 
breakthrough. Such changes could radically alter the ability of 
frail or disabled old people to take part in community life. It 
may be argued that they will not be able to take advantage of new 
technology, but this too is likely to prove to be an ageist 
prejudice, and older people will use technology when it improves 
the quality of their lives. 
 
Special TV programmes directed at elderly audiences via satellite 
or cable links may increase the knowledge needed to campaign for 
better conditions. They may also encourage elders to see 
themselves in a more positive light and so to be more  willing to 
identify themselves as part of a mass movement. 
 
Volunteering and self care 
 
Even if healthy elders are excluded from the labour market, it 
seems very probable that more will find the energy needed to do 
free or expenses-paid voluntary work. Grandmothers will most 
probably continue to look after young children in countries where 
they do so at present. They may also find themselves in semi-paid 
occupations in the caring professions where labour is short. 
 
As the retired population becomes more educated and in most 
European countries slightly more affluent, the opportunities to 
contribute to the economy, even in unpaid capacities are almost 
certain to increase and hence the ability to maintain self 
respect, cohesion and political influence. 
 
Electoral change 
 
All the above changes are likely to have a greater or lesser 
impact on the status of the elderly and on the formation and 
implementation of social policy. However the biggest and most 
inescapable change will be in the numbers of older people as 
compared to younger. Such changes are usually expressed as 
dependency ratios (or less negatively as the converse, support 
ratios). From the point of view of social policy as dominated by 
social security considerations, this is the right measure of 
population ageing. 
 
However if the aim is to consider elders as a factor in policy 
formation or as a pressure group, a more useful measure is the 
proportion of eligible voters over a certain age. The age of 
retirement is sometimes chosen but in European terms this is 
unsatisfactory. Official retirement ages vary and are changing as 
a result of European Court directives on equal opportunities. In 
recent years there has been a widening of the gap between official 
retirement ages and de facto retirement ages, which have dropped 
(Laczko and Phillipson, 1991). There is no reason to think that 
current retirement ages will be maintained over the next thirty 
years. 
 
Also if the aim is to delineate a constituency or potential 
political grouping it is important to consider cohorts below 
retirement age on the grounds that at a certain age they begin to 
look ahead and to identify with retired people. The age of 55 has 
therefore been chosen in Table 1. It gives the present and 
projected proportions for a range of European countries and 
Turkey. The latter gives an idea of the way that Western Europe 
differs from many less developed non-European countries. Eastern 
European countries have been omitted. They show similar but less 
marked tendencies, despite recent evidence of falling life 
expectancies in some countries. 
 
Table 1 
 
Table 1 shows that there is a projected increase of almost 10% in 
the proportion of potential voters over 55 between 1990 and 2020. 
Countries where almost one third of potential voters are now over 
55 will be in the position of having nearly half of all voters in 
this age group by 2020. As might be expected the trend is least 
marked in the Mediterranean countries and most in the Northern 
European. Italy with its sudden collapse in the birth rate is the 
exception on ageing, and Norway with a rise in the birth rate is 
projected to maintain a younger population for longer. 
 
It has been argued, for example by Torres-Gil (1992), that it is 
not just the ability to think ahead to old age (so noticeably 
absent in early adulthood) that unites those over 50 with retired 
people. In middle age many people will begin to worry about the 
growing frailty of their parents. They may then make common cause 
with the elderly lobby to provide better care and perhaps even 
higher incomes to cope with growing frailty. A measure of the 
proportion of voters over 50 produces even more dramatic numbers 
for a potential elders lobby. Table 2 lists those countries where 
half of all potential voters are projected as being over 50 in 
2020. They include most of the northern welfare states, though the 
position of a united Germany is unclear. Switzerland stands out 
among non-EC states with over 55% of the potential electorate in 
the older age groups by 2020.  
 
Table 2 
 
 
From demography to grey power? 
 
Numbers of potential voters are one thing. The conversion from 
numbers to a functioning interest group is quite another. The 
simplistic view, that growing numbers of old people mean more 
power for older age groups and more expenditure on their welfare, 
along with a corresponding shift away from younger people, has 
been argued by Pampel and Williamson (1989). Their argument relies 
on the US for evidence of lobby power and on numbers for all other 
states. This failure to extend the political argument beyond the 
United States is no accident. So far there is little evidence that 
older people form any sort of political group except in America. 
The following paragraphs will consider the interaction of European 
institutions with demographic trends. 
 
Older voters 
 
Political scientists have been concerned with the 'elderly voter' 
as one of several constituencies which must be identified in order 
to predict or analyze the outcome of elections. For example 
Dunleavy and Husbands (1985) identify voters over the age of 55 
separately from the rest of the electorate. They show that retired 
voters were just as likely to vote Labour as the rest of the 
population unless they were among the minority of pensioners with 
above average incomes. These better off pensioners were very much 
more likely than the average to vote conservative. The implication 
is that normal class and interest group cleavages, which set tax 
payers against recipients of state transfers, will continue into 
old age. No solidarity is to be expected among older people 
(Oriol, 1981; Midwinter and Tester, 1987). 
 
Others have related age to voting behaviour in different ways. 
Butler and Stokes (1974) do not believe that age in itself has any 
great influence on voting but that generation or cohort does. As 
they say 'We must not ask how old the elector is, but when he 
(sic) was young.' (Butler and Stokes, 1974: 54). In their view, 
well illustrated by Andrews (1991), people who are loyal to a 
party or set of political principles stay loyal, while those who 
change in youth may change in age. They conclude that: 
'conservation of established political tendencies increases with 
age, not conservatism' (Butler and Stokes, 1974: 62).  
 
It follows from the Butler and Stokes's approach that people may 
well vote for different parties as they age and that the change 
may not always be in favour of more conservative political 
programmes. However between the ages of 50 and 95 there will have 
been many different experiences of youth. If older voters change 
their voting habits there is no guarantee that they will all 
change them in the same direction. It is possible that older 
voters will become politically more divided, not less. 
 
A different theory of elderly voting patterns has been put forward 
by Rose and McAllister (1990). In their view voting behaviour is a 
function of age, though not only of age. Noting that people over 
65 are more likely to vote Conservative, they suggest that age and 
conservatism (with a small c) go together and that if a party is 
seen as the party of change fewer old people will vote for it. 
However they also see evidence that voters can learn or change 
even at older ages. They note that the Labour vote among older 
electors in the UK has fallen. According to this theory, 
therefore, if an elder lobby develops, older voters may well shift 
allegiance to support it. 
 
Other European countries have voting patterns which are less class 
dominated than in Britain. Different social cleavages may be more 
powerful. Religion, region and language may all predict voting 
behaviour more accurately than class. The trend towards a Europe 
of the regions as opposed to a Europe of nation states (Batley and 
Stoker, 1991; Gripaios and Gripaios, 1992; Rhodes, 1992) could 
increase the tendency of all voters, including older people, to 
identify with interest groups rather than political parties. 
 
Diversity v.Interest group formation 
 
As the previous sections illustrated, older people are not a 
natural political grouping in most countries. Even in America 
commentators have persistently stressed their variety (Ragan and 
Davis, 1975; Rose and Peterson, 1963; Williamson et al.1982; 
Torres-Gil, 1992). However elders have been successful in becoming 
a recognised political group and in altering social policy in 
their favour.  
 
While emphases differ, American authors generally see four key 
aspects in the growth of political influence of older people. The 
first is social marginalisation and the development of a sub-
culture (Rose, 1963). Older people recognise their difference from 
younger age groups and form associations. Some writers have seen 
individuals as a key influence, either in favour of elders 
(Lammers and Klingman, 1984) or against them (Putnam (1970). 
Second, once formed the associations need to build coalitions with 
other groups (Pratt, 1976). Authors differ in the emphasis they 
give to different coalitions. Williamson et al (1982) see labour 
union support as a key while Estes (1979) cites a wider coalition 
which she terms the 'aging enterprise', (and regards as ultimately 
harmful to the interests of elders). Third, a framework 
established at national level enables existing movements in favour 
of older people to exercise greater power. Congressional hearings 
and the related legislation raise the profile of elderly people. A 
raised profile results in greater legitimation, first for elderly 
people to join elder organisations and second greater public 
support for elder claims. 
 
The fourth stage is to some extent a reversal. Public recognition 
of the legitimacy of elder claims has limitations. Williamson et 
al (1982) and Torres-Gil (1992) both follow Mauss (1971) in seeing 
the elder lobby in the US as an example of a movement in danger of 
being destroyed by its success. Progress, from a marginalised 
group to strength via a combination of lobby power and broad 
social concern with the plight of older Americans, first results 
in gains for older people, particularly in the field of social 
security and health care. However the success is widely perceived 
as having resulted in shift of social resources from younger 
workers towards elder retired people. When such a shift is so big 
that it is seen as unfair or going too far, the legitimacy of 
demands made by the elders lobby is challenged. For example 
Americans for Generational Equality (AGE), now wound up and merged 
with the Association of Baby Boomers was formed to combat 
'excessive' shifts in resources from young to old. Torres-Gil 
(1992) sees the repeal, in 1989, of the Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act 1988 as the turning point for American elders. As he 
says, 'No other major legislation had ever been enacted and 
repealed within a year due to political pressure. On the other 
hand, older people were perceived, as a result, as a selfish 
interest group wanting expanded benefits without the burden on 
paying for them'.( Torres-Gil 1992: 81). 
 
US commentators therefore see a future in which older people will 
have more political resources in terms of votes, education and 
possibly money, but not necessarily more political power unless 
the legitimacy of their demands can be maintained or they move to 
voting as a bloc. 
 
Applicability of US experience to Europe 
 
Marginalisation 
 
Following Rose (1965) there is no difficulty in seeing older 
people in Europe as a marginalised group even though the degree of 
marginalisation may vary in modern times. The elderly have long 
been held in low esteem across the continent. Stearns (1977) gives 
a particularly negative historical picture of the status of old 
people in France (Sterns,1977), though this is somewhat modified 
by Troyanski (1982). A select group of rich old people were able 
to maintain respect (Guillemard, 1980) because of their control 
over material resources, but even they were often recorded as 
objects of envy and ridicule rather than veneration or respect 
among the younger generation who wished to come into their 
inheritance. There appears to be little historical evidence in any 
European country of a golden age when property-less old men were 
well treated, let alone old women.  
 
In modern times welfare states have improved the lot of the old to 
varying degrees. The process has advanced furthest in Scandinavia. 
In Denmark for example elderly users are represented on local user 
councils for the services they consume (Kristiansen, 1992). As 
DaneAge put it 'elderly people... were characterised chiefly by 
poverty, ill health and loneliness...we do not feel as powerless 
or alienated as many people did in the past.. a change in the 
pattern of sex roles has especially made women more self confident 
and active' (DaneAge, 1990: 40). Poverty however remains for some, 
even in Denmark. In France a conscious attempt was made to enable 
elders to share in the benefits of post war reconstruction via the 
1962 Raport Laroque (Guillemard, 1980), but it is still difficult 
to argue that elderly people are not marginalised both financially 
and culturally. It therefore seems safe to predict that older 
people will be identifiable as a marginalised group in all 
European countries over the next decades. 
 
Development of a Mass Movement 
 
The ability of European elders to form mass movements on the lines 
of the American Association of Retired Person with 30m members 
(Torres-Gil, 1992) is likely to be limited. The strong European 
tradition of marginalising or downgrading old people makes it less 
likely that they will wish to identify themselves as 'old' by 
joining a mass movement of seniors. For the same reasons the 
development of high profile militant movements such as the Grey 
Panthers will also have limited impact. At present there is no 
catalyst such as the need for cheap health insurance, identified 
by Williamson et al (1982) as one of the major factors behind the 
success of AARP.  
 
Lobby power 
 
The ability to lobby is not dependent on a mass movement and the 
growth of existing pensioner's groups in Europe should not be 
underestimated. There are pensioners groups in all EC countries 
(EurolinkAge,1991; Gifford, 1990) and some of these may yet move 
into the high profile activist role taken by the Grey Panthers in 
America. While most are not very effective as lobbyists at 
national level their influence at Community level is bound to 
increase. 
 
A framework for lobbying 
 
European national political systems do not lend themselves to 
lobbying on the American scale but evidence from Brussels suggests 
that there is much greater potential for lobbying at the EC level. 
The potential in Brussels for older people and the European ageing 
enterprise to build up a lobby on the American pattern already 
exists and is developing fast (Fallick, 1990; Gardner, 1991).  
 
The development of lobbying is possible because the last few years 
have seen a very change in competencies at EC level.  Whereas the 
Treaty of Rome made no mention of older people, the Social Charter 
(1989) included them very marginally by noting that every worker 
should 'be able to enjoy resources affording him or her a decent 
standard of living' on retirement and that those who need it 
should be entitled to 'sufficient resources and to medical and 
social assistance specifically suited to his needs' (Social 
Europe, 1990: 49-50). The first EC Programme for Older People 
began in 1991 with a small budget of  2.2m ECU. Budget increases 
were exponential in the following two years but slower growth is 
expected after 1993.  
 
A European Observatory on Ageing and Older People (see Walker et 
al., 1992, for the first annual report) was set up in 1991. This 
will henceforth provide one focus for the campaigns of pensioner 
groups and other national pressure groups. The first meeting of 
the EC Non-Governmental Organisations Liaison Group, involving 
cross-national pensioners groups, EurolinkAge, Eurag, Fiapa and 
the European TUC Retired Section also took place in 1991. In 1992 
the first European Pensioners Parliament met in Luxembourg. All 
these activities help to legitimate the claims of older people. 
They may have relatively little impact on individual governments 
but they are part of an expanding area of activity in the EC. 
The designation of 1993 as the European Year of the Elderly and 
Intergenerational Solidarity is another such symbolic gesture. 
National governments allocate a greater or lesser amount of money 
to support the Year. 
 
The framework for legislation and legitimation and even for the 
implementation of a restricted range of initiatives is therefore 
rapidly being strengthened. Court decisions, such and the European 
Court of Justice ruling in the Barber case (1990) that pensions 
are pay and hence equal pensions should be offered for equal work 
are building a legal, as opposed to a political and 
administrative, framework. It will further enable older people's 
groups and the coalitions which support them to extend their 
influence and generate legitimacy. Equally legislation and 
decisions by the ECJ may be expected to increase awareness of 
elder rights and to highlight any cases of social dumping of 
pensioners.  
 
The expansion of administrative competence may be more difficult 
to achieve as nationalist forces grow in power and countries rely 
on the principle of subsidiarity to restrict the growth of EC 
competence (see Spicker, 1991). The important area of state 
pensions are subject to the principal of subsidiarity and will not 
be harmonised in the foreseeable future. However moves to 
harmonise private pensions and retirement ages may be more likely 
since they come under the heading of distortions in the labour 
market, and hence can be seen as an area of competence under the 
original aims of the Treaty of Rome to establish a free market in 
labour. Other areas such as rail concessions may be harmonised 
across Europe, helping to place a framework of entitlements in 
position which will enhance the sense of common purpose among 
Europe's elders. Equally however such developments may be blocked 
by other governments as they have been by the British. 
 
The addition of the new concept of 'European citizenship' in the 
Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty opens up much greater 
possibilities for elder rights and claims. As Spicker (1991) 
argues, such citizenship is no longer seen as restricted to those 
who are in paid work. Older people are unlikely to find themselves 
with full citizenship overnight but the concept has potential. 
Equally the addition of health as an area of competence under 
Maastricht (Title XVII Public Health) will extend EC competence 
into an area of vital interest to elders. It is possible in these 
developments to discern parallels with the growth of competence in 
social affairs of the US government (Spicker, 1991). 
 
Lobby coalitions 
 
So far, as outlined above, support for the elders lobby has mainly 
come from NGOs. In America trade unions were an important 
constituent of the ageing lobby coalition. The role of European 
trade unions in campaigning for a better deal in old age is 
variable but nowhere very salient. In Germany unions have been 
concerned with pensions in terms of deferred pay but have confined 
themselves to the narrow constituency of indigenous workers. Old 
age poverty for women and gastarbeiter have barely figured on the 
union agenda. In future there will be scope for union pressure but 
cross-national co-ordination will be needed (Vogel-Polsky and 
Vogel, 1991). However such pressure may also come from health and 
care workers unions as much as from general labour. In the late 
sixties and early seventies, service unions were seen as one of 
the main pressure groups for better service and higher expenditure 
and they may yet figure as a key actors in the European ageing 
enterprise. In southern Europe all the developments outlined are 
likely to proceed more slowly. 
 
New developments 
 
Numbers as political power 
 
There are three new ingredients in the European situation which 
have not been identified by American analysts. These are 
demographic change, change in the position of women and the 
development of a Europe of the regions. The first is the 
demographic strength of older people. A public choice model does 
not necessarily need a fully developed mass movement in order to 
instigate changes in policy. Sheer numbers and a higher profile 
may be enough to cause politicians and other policy makers to 
alter their perceptions of the parameters within which they 
operate (Wilson, 1991) in favour of older people. Developments in 
Brussels will reinforce any such trend.  
 
In this connection, Kasschau (1978) found, in his studies of 
American policy making, that although political analysts (and no 
doubt older people themselves), saw elders as too heterogeneous to 
form united interest groups, decision takers saw them as 
homogenous. This is an important point and one well known to 
gerontologists. Policy makers do tend to see older people as a 
mass and they can be expected to react accordingly if they find 
they are dealing with large numbers of old people or vocal 
pressure groups. The chances are high therefore, that older people 
will affect policies in areas where they are most numerous even 
though this effect will be indirect rather than direct via 
political representation. 
 
Women  
 
Second there is the possibility that women will become a 
significantly greater influence than they are at present.  
The issue of population ageing is of great importance for women. 
They are the primary providers (paid and unpaid) of care at all 
ages. As the numbers of very old increase the chances are that 
women, at or near retirement age, will have to spend more time 
caring for frail elders and that this caregiving role may last 
until well into their own old age. Women as survivors are more 
likely to live to be frail. They are therefore the main recipients 
of care as well as the main providers. So far this conjunction has 
helped to keep informal caregiving off the policy agenda in most 
countries. Informal care has been seen as something women do 
'naturally'. However there is no reason to think that this 
invisibility will continue as the number of frail elders rises and 
as the opportunities for paid employment, better incomes and more 
varied activities increase. Also, in advanced old age, many men 
(husbands) do take on caring responsibilities (Arber ad Gilbert, 
1989) and their contribution should not be forgotten. These 
caregiving husbands may join politically with the great majority 
of older women who are caregivers and receivers to force some 
changes in formal caregiving. 
 
Table 3 
 
 
Table 3 indicates that the proportion of older women among voters 
is already high at around a fifth. It will rise in most countries 
towards a third if current projections are accurate. It will be 
very much higher in retirement areas and areas of out migration. 
In the circumstance it is possible that older women's concerns 
will remain as invisible as they are at present but it seems 
unlikely that this will be the case.  
 
It might be argued that older women are apolitical rather than 
political (see Job, 1984 for empirical evidence), and that they 
are less likely than men to vote on any issue, let alone to 
combine politically. In future however, the drive to increase care 
in the community and so the burdens on carers, which is common to 
all European countries (Abel-Smith 1992), may make some form of 
caregiver support a necessity. Campaigns, legislation and the 
legitimisation that a benefit can bring may be expected to 
increase the political consciousness of older women both as 
caregivers and care recipients. 
 
Solidarity at regional and local levels 
 
Third, while European political and social conditions may appear 
to be against the growth of national pensioner movements, 
increased pensioner power at regional and local level is much more 
likely. Regional ability to by-pass the national capital and lobby 
directly in Brussels and Strasbourg is likely to increase 
(Leonardi and Nicoletti, 1990). Regions may vary in their level of 
concern with older citizens' issues. The figures presented in 
Tables 1 and 2 are national totals but conceal wide differences at 
sub-national level. In retirement areas, particularly, it is 
possible to envisage a large population of relatively well 
educated and marginally more affluent pensioners having a strong 
influence on local politics and the allocation of resources at a 
local level. 
 
Two scenarios leading to better deals for retired people can be 
postulated. In one retirement migrants make common cause with a 
local political party and use their support as a lever for better 
services. In the second, a public choice model, local parties 
compete for the votes of pensioners by adopting policies aimed at 
their needs. In both cases active retired people may take over 
leadership in local politics. They have the time and increasingly 
they will be educated and possibly affluent.  
 
Such local developments may be strengthened by small scale social 
changes which could be expected to increase the ability of older 
people to identify as part of a group: the decrease in family 
contact through migration; changes in voting patterns as older 
people become more educated and more willing to vote on age group 
lines; the growth of segregated housing; and cable or satellite 
television programmes targeted on older age groups. In those 
countries (most) where the relief of poverty is a local government 
issue there will be clear benefits which local politicians can 
offer to impoverished older voters, most of whom will be women.  
 
The increased development of regional funds, which will often be 
aimed at declining areas where the number of older people is high, 
may well strengthen the hand of local politicians who want to 
provide for the majority of their voters (older people). All these 
developments can be seen as helping to raise consciousness in 
areas where old people form the great majority of the electorate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
If the American analysts are right the peak of grey power in 
American has already been passed. The analysis provided by 
Williams et al and Torres-Gil both indicate 'a shift from 
automatic legitimacy to political justification for senior citizen 
benefits' (Torres-Gil 1992: 81). Europe seems very far from that 
stage. 
 
In Europe older people are handicapped by below average incomes 
and by a strong tendency for younger age groups to perceive them 
as a burden. Pensions are rarely seen as deferred earnings and 
raising pensions is not so far seen as a measure to enable an old 
age which is healthier, more trouble free, and hence a cheaper in 
terms of services. The economic benefits arising from unpaid 
voluntary work, informal care and self care (a very high consumer 
of personal resources among frail elders), are unlikely to be 
added to national accounting frameworks in the foreseeable future. 
It follows that the contribution of older people to national 
economies will continue to be undervalued and they will continue 
to be seen as a burden by many in the younger policy making 
cohorts.  
 
However there are European developments which could bring about 
changes in the present allocation of resources between 
generations. The results would be to improve the quality of life 
of older people and to bring them nearer full citizenship in old 
age. The framework for legal and social service developments in 
favour of aged citizens is already being developed in Brussels. 
More sophisticated lobbying, building on what is already in place, 
is likely to raise consciousness and extend the existing 
framework. Older voters will have a growing political legitimacy 
even if they do not form an identifiable mass movement.  
 
A Europe of the regions will give greater opportunities for local 
politicians to bypass national policies and meet local needs for 
better conditions for older citizens. The sheer numbers of older 
voters in some retirement areas will affect political perceptions 
even if there are no political movements specifically organised by 
older people. The strong tendency of policy makers to perceive 
elders as an undifferentiated mass will indirectly increase their 
influence on policy. 
 
The impact of these changes will be mediated by the strength of 
women's movements in the future. The majority of older voters will 
be women and the majority of very old care recipients will also be 
women. It is possible that in countries where the women's movement 
has little support, the issue of full citizenship for women will 
continue to be ignored, and with it the needs of older people. On 
the other hand in countries, or regions, where the women's 
movement is strong and where younger and older women make common 
cause it is possible to envisage a real shift towards full 
citizenship. The result might be greater diversity across Europe 
in the way old people are treated. Alternatively, if policy makers 
converge on an ideal of citizenship for all, there will be greater 
uniformity, even though the forces for change are unequal between 
countries. 
 
While some might deplore such developments, it is entirely 
possible to argue that policies which are good for elders are good 
for all citizens over a wide range of government activities. For 
example Day (1992) lists good public transport, safety in and out 
of doors, accessible parks and other informal meeting places, low 
cost rented housing close to all amenities, and walk-in health and 
counselling services. These are all improvements which would 
benefit communities as a whole. Better policies for elders could 
be seen as a local communal opportunity, even if national 
governments are slow to act. 
 
Finally the implication for social policy of enhanced senior power 
are very great. Social policy is traditionally a matter of 
campaigns, research or administration on behalf of disadvantaged 
groups. Public policy on the other hand has tended to deal with 
mainstream issues such as defence. If planning and servicing old 
age should become a mainstream matter involving the majority of 
voting citizens the social policy paradigm would, it is to be 
hoped, undergo a welcome shift. Future European research needs to 
address the question of whether American experience can or should 
be repeated and what conditions favour or prevent the development 
of grey power in individual countries.  
 
 
(1) I would like to thank Brendan O'Duffy for assistance with 
population data. 
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Table 1  Percentage of voters over 55 in selected European  
             countries (actuals and projections) 
 
 
                              1990       2000        2010      
2020       
                   %          %          %          % 
 
Belgium           33         34         37         43  
Denmark           32         34         39         44 
France            32         32         36         40  
Germany           32         37         39         45  
Greece            35         36         38         40  
Eire              27         26         27         31  
Italy             33         35         39         44  
Luxembourg        32         35         40         45  
Netherlands       29         31         37         42  
Portugal          32         31         34         38  
Spain             32         32         34         39  
UK                34         34         36         41  
EC12              33         34         37         42  
 
Austria           32         34         37         43  
Finland           30         32         40         44  
Norway            33         32         36         40  
Sweden            35         36         39         42  
Switzerland       32         36         41         46  
Turkey            18         18         19         23  
 
Source: Calculated from Bulatao., R. et al. World Population 
Projections 1989-90 Edition, World Bank, Baltimore, Johns  
Hopkins University Press 
 
 
 
Table 2 Countries in which more than half the voters are over  
            50 by 2020 (actuals and projections) 
 
                1990       2000       2010      2020 
                   %          %          %          % 
 
Belgium           41         42         47         52 
Denmark           39         43         48         53 
Italy             41         44         47         54 
Luxembourg        40         44         50         54 
Netherlands       36         40         47         52 
UK                41         43         45         50 
EC 12             40         42         46         52 
 
Austria           40         43         46         53 
Finland           38         43         49            53 
Sweden            42         46         48         51 
Switzerland       40         45         50         55 
 
Source: Calculated from Bulatao., R. et al. World Population 
Projections 1989-90 Edition, World Bank, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press 
 
 
  Table 3 Women over the Age of 50 as a Percentage of Total  
                           Voters 
 
                1990       2000       2010       2020 
 
Belgium           23         23         25         28 
Denmark           21         23         26         28 
France            22         22         24         26 
Germany           24         24         26            29    
Greece            24         24         25         27 
Ireland           18         17         19         21 
Italy             23         24         26         29 
Luxembourg        22         24         27         29 
Netherlands       19         22         25         29 
Portugal          22         22         25         26 
Spain             21         22         23            26 
UK                22         23         24         27 
E 12              22         23         25         28 
 
Austria           23         24         25         29 
Finland           21         23         26         28 
Norway            21         22         24         26 
Sweden            23         25         26         28 
Switzerland       22         25         27         30 
Turkey            12         12         13         16 
 
Source: Calculated from Bulatao., R. et al. World Population 
Projections 1989-90 Edition, World Bank Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press 
 
